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That there has been a shift over the last 10 years in
development talk and writing, from predominant
concern with growth to concern with distribution, is
undeniable.
About the causes of that shift there may be various
views. It is not, I suspect, solely to be explained as a
triumphal story of learning from the 'failure' of past
policies, nor even as one of increasingly humane
enlightenment.
That is why it seems proper to begin an assessment of
the basic needs strategy, as the latest version of the
distributional concern, by questioning that concern
itself. I would like to pose, and offer my answers to,
the following four questions. In formulating them I
seek to draw a distinction between the scholarly
analytical activity of social scientists and the
preaching activity of development experts (including
those same social scientists). Such a distinction is, of
course, old-fashioned; indeed, the view appears to be
gaining ground that to seek to make such a
distinction is to be guilty of a curiously horrendous
kind of naiveté called 'positivism'. I find this guilt
easy to live with.
Is the concentration of scholarly analytical
activity on distributional questions justified?
Are rich country people justified, when behaving in
the prescriptive mode, in urging egalitarian-
distributional development objectives on poor
countries?
Assuming that they are, is the basic needs strategy
an improvement on earlier prescriptions, either in the
sense of incorporating any new discoveries of science,
or in the sense of incorporating values which we, as
enlightened connoisseurs of humane ethics, would
recognise to be superior to those of earlier
prescriptions?
Irrespective of the answers to the above questions,
is it tactically wise for aid agencies to espouse basic
needs strategy as their conception of what a good
development policy should be?
Research problems: distribution or growth?
My answer to the first question: No. There are, to be
sure, a number of distributional questions which
need more analytical worknot least how you
measure distribution, as Beckerman's recent sceptical
note points out (Beckerman 1977). The realistic
implications of different alternative technologies, the
way different income distributions affect consumption
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patterns, hence the structure of demand, of
production and hence the volume of employment,
the relative productivities of big farmers and small
farmers under different conditions, what determines
the extent to which the poor get their intended access
to public services, etc, are all genuine intellectual
problems to which there have already been some
notable contributions and need to be more. Too
much of the writing on these and similar topics,
however, is concerned not so much with showing
how things might be differents and how certain
variables affect other variables, as with adding yet
another piece of evidence to the general proposition
that nice guys finish last and the poor always get
cheatedwhich is less helpful.
That question apart, it is common ground that the
political possibilities of more equal distribution-
short of revolutionary changesare small without
growth. Growth, then, is in a sense prior. It is also
intellectually (though not politically) more difficult.
A government which has the political will to secure
greater equality does not need experts to tell it how to
reduce the span of public sector salaries from 35:1 to
20:1. Arithmetical skills are rarely so scarce. 1f it
decides to put all its new health investment in rural
areas, it may be able to use expert advice on the cost-
effectiveness of different ways of doing so, but such
expertise is not, now, in altogether short supply. How
best to use investment funds, howeverthe long
term economic and social implications (relevant to
whatever set of values a society is assumed to hold) of
putting them in a hydro-electric installation, or a
fertiliser plant, or a technical schoolis a much more
complex analytical problem. How to improve the
efficiency of a state steel mill, how to inveigle the
wealthy into investing in factories rather than the
speculative purchase of urban land, how to set
conditions on MNC investment which ensure the
maximum local benefits, how to reduce harvest
fluctuations or induce farmers to grow for the market
in spite of them, how to reduce the time lag between
the arrival of a new turnkey plant and the day when
every bit of it can be repaired by one's own people-- -
these remain much more problematic and intellec-
tually challenging questions on which scholarly
professionals have more potentially to contribute,
both those who are happy to talk about growth' and
those who are prepared to discuss the subject matter
provided they can call it 'accumulation'.
More energy, would, I believe, be devoted to these
questions if development researchers and theorists
were not so concerned if not tO intermingle political
prescription with expertise, at least to show, by the
way they deploy their expertise, that they are on the
side of the egalitarian angels.
To preach or not to preach
My second question is not about the deployment of
expertise, but about our preaching. As people who
happen to work on developing country problems and
are also political animals with views of our own, most
development theorists, apart from and in addition to
any scholarly activities, occasionally like to sound off
in the 'ought' and 'should' mode in such publications
as the JDS Bulletin. 1-low justified are we in urging
egalitarian policies on Third World governments?
One view about the principle of preaching equality to
foreign governments is that one should show a
proper diffidence, and in particular not presume on a
cultural dependency relationship by assuming that
the preachings of intellectuals in the metropolitan
rich countries should be of interest to governments of
the periphery. As against this one can take one's
stand on a basic common humanity: every, but
every, man's death diminishes me.
How one feels on the matter is likely to depend on
how one feels about nationalism. Some would feel
that nationalism should be accounted among the
basic needs. That is one view and one which would
certainly counsel the diffidence suggested above.
Another view is that nationalism, in Bertrand
Russell's words, is "undoubtedly the most dangerous
vice of our tin,e----far more dangerous than
drunkenness, or drugs, or commercial dishonesty, or
any of the other vices against which a conventional
moral education is directed" (quoted from Russell,
1932 in Ayer, 1972:146). On this view of nationalism
one is entitled to ignore the moral significance of
frontiers and passports and express oneself with as
much passion and commitment about Ugandan or
Indian politics as about British politics.
There are two problems with this, however. One has
been pointed out by Deepak 1al (1976). If one
embraces oneself in the same moral community as
the Nigerian physician and the Nigerian peasant,
then the gap between their incomes is neither more
nor less morally indefensible than the gap between
the Nigerian peasant and oneself- and one does have
it in one's power to do something about the latter.
Secondly, if one thinks that nationalism íss icked and
that one is entitled to rail at Nigerian inequality, one
must surely, on proper Kantian principles, grant thai
what is wicked nationalism for oneself is alloahly
wicked for Nigerians too. In which ease one gies the
Nigerian physician a conclusive answer to any
suggestions that Nigeria should adopt more
egalitarian income distribution policies. "Why
should you see my incomc in relation to that of a
Nigerian peasant? 1, as a professional man, belong
to, find my soulmates jn, hold as my reference group,
the international community of physicians. Why
should I be paid less than a British doctor? What do
I have in common with this peasant fellow? Common
Nigerian nationality? Nationality, for God's sake!"
It is a difficult problem, full of ambiguities. I can see
how one can conscientiously feel so strongly about
making the world a better place that one cuts
through these scruples and can be happy to use both
the prestige conferred by history on the middle-class
of former imperialist powers and the authority of a
reputation for expertise, and preach as it were from
expertise, offering persuasive definitions of the 'true'
meaning of development. Personally I find a more
diffident stance, and one which seeks always to keep
analysis and prescription tidily separate, more
comfortable.
There remains the question of how far governments
are receptive to egalitarian preaching anyway. lt
seems to be generally conceded that the typical Third
World government is not likely to be much
preoccupied with satisfying its population's basic
needs. Curiously, it seems more often to be assumed
that it is more likely to be concerned with the basic
needs of the nation's grandchildren--at least that
would seem so judging from the frequency with which
the growth versus equity dilemma is treated as
primarily a matter of inter-generational distribution.
What the Third World rulers actually do set as their
objectives is a research topic too much neglected. I
suspect that a major motive, over and above survival,
is to increase national 'strength' and prestige, to
raise the nation's position in the international
pecking order and thereby their own position in the
ranks of the world's rulers, to give Ruritanians,
especially top Ruritanians, greater reason for feeling
proud of their Ruritanianness. This, 1 suspect, is the
chief significance of growth for those Third World
politicians who are being advised to be less
preoccupied with it, and in so far as it is a quest for
dignity, which appears in most people's list of basic
needs, it is a quest for which one can have some
sympathy. It is, at least, one which should be taken
into account in every basic needs strategist's
reckoning.
Basic needs: an improvement on other egalitarian
prescriptions?
The third question is: if one has overcome one's
scruples about telling Third World governments what
their objectives should he, is the basic needs strategy
an improvement on earlier egalitarian prescriptions,
or should one shrug it off as simply a routine product
of the internal dynamics of the International
Development Conference Community, reflecting the
accelerating rate of slogan obsolescence? (Itself,
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presumably, a consequence of the growth of the
world economymore GNP, more IDSs, more
international agencies, more rallies of the IDCC in
Rome and Bucharest, more cosy gatherings in
Bellagio and Cocoyoc, more money for research, but
even more people competing for it and hence a higher
premium on a nice new attractive slogan in which to
wrap a research project or the proposal for a new
conference or a new international agency.)
Perhaps one could phrase the question this way:
would a hypothetical government which adopted a
basic needs strategy be doing something markedly
different from, for example, one which took as its
bible the IBRD-IDS prescription for Redistribution
with Growth? Does it, first, incorporate new insights
or discoveries? Is it based on newly discovered facts
about the structure of the economy or society?
There is by now a good deal of literature which
genuinely contributes to our knowledge of distribu-
tion issues and their relation to growth. L cannot,
however, recall seeing in the basic needs literature
references to research findings which lead one directly
to the consideration of basic needs. Nor do the plans
for basic needs research with which every institute in
the business has armed itself appear to be
characterised by hypotheses which are either clear in
their formulatión or likely to be interesting and
illuminating when tested.
So does it mark a political or moral advance? The
amorphous nature of the basic needs doctrine makes
that also a difficult question to answer.
Most definitions of a Basic Needs strategy include
standard references to the right to productive
employment; building up the production infra-
structure; an emphasis on the production of basic
wage goods, and even (though usually in a vague
form) some reference to 'Redistribution with
Growth' concerns with changing the primary
distribution of income by allowing the lowest income
groups access to resources. These things are not new.
What are new are first, participationan illustration,
I suppose, of the rapidity with which the welfare
ideologies thrown up by advanced twentieth century
capitalism are transmitted to developing countries-
and second, the state provision of community
welfare services.
But how much of the latter, and at the expense of
what other objectives? If Basic Needs means more
state expenditure on basic services, must it not also
mean lower growth--assuming that adoption of the
basic needs objectives will not, of itself, alter revenue-
collecting capacities.
Not at all, is one answer. One only assumes so if one
is bemused by national accounting conventions.
Investment in a textile mill produces cheaper
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clothing, saving a villager from cold and loss of
dignity. Investment in a water supply system saves
him from enteritis. The first is in the market sphere
and counts in GNP, the second does not; does that
really imply difference in the growth in satisfactions?
The question needs more than my commonsense
economics, but presumably the answer is that the
difference lies in the long term growth prospects.
Both may have backward linkages, but the textile
cycle additionally yields profits and taxes which feed
into further investment; the water cycle has no
comparable multiplier effect unless the enteritis was
actually hampering the villagers productivity or
unless the water is paid for. At any rate, the point is
that if increased public welfare expenditure is indeed
the distinctive feature of the basic needs strategy, it
would be better if this were made plain and the
relation to the growth/national strength objectives of
Third World governments not glossed over.
Basic needs and aid
The final question concerns basic needs and aid. "A
basic needs approach has a promising potential for
reanimating public support for development aid".
Thus the latest DAC Annual Report (p. 94), and just
as the original shift of concern towards distribution
questions sprang partly from discussions of aid, so it
is perhaps not fanciful to suppose that the need on the
part of those in the aid field to reanimate flagging
public support plays a considerable role in explaining
the current discussion of basic needs.
lt may well work to some degree. There is nothing
much but humanitarian sentiment left for the aid
lobby to draw on (dire threats to the security of the
rich North if it does not take the poor South seriously
have never seemed very realistic) and it is always
genuine and deserving poverty which has best
loosened purse strings.
But what about the recipients of aid? There are
formidable problems in trying to give basic needs
aid to countries whose governments are interested
jn something else. I believe those problems will be
exacerbated even in governments with relatively
egalitarian policies by suspicion of the motives
of the rich-country delegates cosily gathered in the
OECD chateau.
First they will see basic needs fulfilment as being at
the expense of growth, at the expense, therefore, of
the assertion of national strength they seek--a
denial, in other words, of their quest for equality in
the comity of nations. lt would be surprising if they
did not bristle at the finality with which MacNarnara
uses the record of the last 25 years to claim ("The
Speech", September 1977) that catching up in GNP
terms "was never a realistic objective in the first
place" for developing countries, and that they should,
rather, "seek to narrow the gap ... in terms of the
quality of life: in nutrition, literacy, life expectancy.
and the physical and social environmen t"-though
not, presumably, in terms of the particular ways Mr
MacNamara uses high income to improve his
physical and social environment and enhance the
quality of his life (not all, by any means, ways
involving "positional goods" incapable of being
generalised--or shared),
What is more, they are likely to see this advice as
being far from disinterested--as reflecting the rich
countries' concern with limits-to-growth projections.
of the world's resource capacity: "they can't all be as
rich as we are, and it would be wrong to encourage
them to compete with us for scarce resources in a
competition they are bound to lose. Rest if they are
contented with satisfying basic needs. And, anyway,
why would they want to lumber themselves with the
environmental destruction, the strains and ugliness
of machine civilization, which we have wished upon
ourselves when they have their own so much more
spiritual way of life ...." etc.
Finally, though, one possible point in favour of basic
needs talk in the aid sector of the International
Development Conference Community. If it helps to
shift aid thinking away from the niore to the poorest'
kind of charity towards a bureaucratic world
taxation system in which all mankind is guaranteed a
minimum living level "as of right' (in Bevcridge
terms), and all mankind is liable to tax in order to
finance itif it points towards a world in which
nationalism is genuinely eroded and a universal
moral community is created to match the global
nature of modern capitalism, so that income
transfers become as automatic as they now are
through the fiscal and welfare systems of individual
statesif that is what the advocates of a basic needs
strategy have in mind as their long-term goal, then I
would be very happy to cheer them on.
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